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Abstract The traditional Dutch rental contract is permanent (i.e. time unlimited), but
there are indications that in recent years the number of temporary rental contracts has
increased considerably. Dutch housing policy appears to be responding to this by pursuing
deregulation of the conditions under which temporary rent is permitted. It is in this regard
startling that there is no reliable data available about the size or character of the temporary
sector, and it has thus far not attracted any scholarly attention. Given that temporary rent
can be viewed as a form of precarisation, a transfer of risk to citizens, with corresponding
negative effects on the lives of those involved, it is imperative to close this knowledge gap.
This paper is a first attempt to do this. Firstly, I systematically review the scarce evidence
that is currently available, and secondly, I explore why the rise of temporary rent has thus
far failed to stimulate any social debate; it appears to constitute a silent precarisation that
contrasts with the politically sensitive issue of labour precarisation. In doing so, I will
identify the research questions that must be answered if the significance of this process for
both tenants and wider welfare-state restructuring is to be fully understood.
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1 Introduction
‘Everyone is living anti-squat!’ was the title of a recent news item on the Dutch national
popular television channel RTL4 (EditieNL, 5 December 2012). Although ‘everyone’ is
clearly hyperbole, in the last 15 years, the Netherlands has indeed seen a proliferation of
temporary housing arrangements (Buchholz 2009; Van der Molen 2011). It is, for instance,
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estimated that there are 50,000 anti-squatters; rent paying, live-in security guards occu-
pying empty buildings, in the Netherlands (Renooy 2008). The rise of such precarious
housing is striking, given that strong protection of tenants has been the norm in the
Netherlands for decades. Normally, rental contracts have unlimited duration and can only
be terminated by the landlord for a legally very restricted number of reasons (Lawson
2011). Most rent prices as well as ceilings on annual increases are determined by the
government (Haffner and Boumeester 2010, 2014). In contrast, temporary contracts offer
hardly any protection to the tenant. They are characterised by their limited and usually
unclear duration (Uitermark 2009), while rent prices are often determined by the market.
Officially, to rent out a dwelling with a temporary contract, the house owner requires a
permit. Permission is restricted to specific situations (i.e. substantial renovation or demolition
in the foreseeable future, sale of a previously owner-occupied dwelling) for a limited duration
when it is deemed infeasible to rent out dwellings on a permanent basis (Dutch Vacancy law,
article 15). The secondmain form of temporary tenure in the Netherlands is anti-squat, where
the renter functions as a low-level ‘security guard’ for an empty property by living in it. The
anti-squatter is not paid for this function and furthermore is expected to pay rent.
Although reliable figures are not available (Priemus 2011), anecdotal evidence suggests
that both temporary rent and anti-squat are increasingly becoming normal forms of living.
According to an article in the national newspaper De Volkskrant (Gualtherie Van Weezel
2012), applications for temporary rent permits doubled in 2011, and for instance, in 2013,
almost half of all dwellings rented out newly by Amsterdam housing corporations had a
temporary contract (calculated from AFWC 2014:66). Various sources indicate explosive
turnover growth in the anti-squat brokerage sector (e.g. Reijmer 2011; Voorn and Hee-
sakkers 2012). Moreover, there is a tendency amongst politicians and policy makers to-
wards expansion of temporary rent. Following an extension of the maximum period of
temporary rent from 3 years to 5 years in 2005, the Dutch parliament in 2013 decided on a
further relaxation of the regulations to make even longer periods permissible. New, far-
reaching changes normalising temporary renting contracts are at the time of writing under
discussion in Parliament and expected to come into effect by July 2015.
It is striking, in this regard, that when asked by critical members of parliament how
large the temporary rent sector actually is in the Netherlands, the Ministry of Housing
responded that no official statistics are available (Report of the Discussion 2012). In
academic circles, there has also been very little attention for the issue (but see Priemus
2011). Scientists studying housing tend to focus on topics such as, for instance, the role of
real estate capital in the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and its aftermath (e.g. Ronald and
Dol 2011) or the economic and social effects of the shift from renting to home ownership
(e.g. Helderman et al. 2004). There is, however, little attention for shifts towards temporary
contracts inside the rental sector itself. Academic studies of the Dutch housing sector
consistently assume that temporary rent is a structurally marginal phenomenon. Although
research agendas are of course always socially constructed, this opinion (as discussed later)
is at least partly informed by the difficulty of quantifying the size and growth of the sector.
I argue that the absence of rigorous analysis of temporary housing in theNetherlands needs
to be addressed because of its potential impact on thewider Dutch housing sector and because
of its implications for the more general precarisation of existence in advanced welfare states.
Precarious living arrangements are widely acknowledged to impact negatively upon
people’s lives (Cairney and Boyle 2004; Elsinga et al. 2008). Apart from the actual reality
of finding oneself without affordable accommodation as the contract ends, the fear of
losing one’s home is also influential (Hulse et al. 2011). This influences people’s onto-
logical security, a concept coined by Laing (1960) and developed by Giddens (1991, see
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also Saunders 1990). It refers to the way people give meaning to their life, and how
continuity and stability help deal with the experience of everyday events. It is difficult to
build a stable life, if it is unclear when one has to move and what opportunities for new
accommodation will be available.
The increase in temporary housing arrangements can be seen as a form of precarisation.
This concept usually refers to the increase in precarious work: ‘employment that is
uncertain, unpredictable, and risky from the point of view from the worker’ (Kalleberg
2009:2). Since the end of the 1970s, due to political and economic restructuring, labour
relations have increasingly become characterised by a shift of risks from the employer to
the worker (Thompson 2010). As a result, Bourdieu (1998) famously stated that precarity is
now everywhere (see also Beck 1992).
It is clear that there are parallels between the socially negative effects of precarious
housing and those associated with precarious labour. Yet, there have thus far not been any
notable attempts to understand temporary housing in terms of the precarisation literature or
to analyse why (in contrast to labour) there is so little critical attention for the growth of
temporary housing. I propose a research agenda for analysing the growth of temporary
housing through a precarisation lens. This will enable a better understanding of the wider
significance of this silent precarisation for broader welfare-state restructuring.
In the remainder of this paper, I begin by formally defining the concept of temporary rental
arrangements and describing the main forms that currently exist in the Netherlands. After
verifying that there are nomeaningful data available regarding the size of the temporary sector,
but that there are nevertheless many strong signals that the sector is (rapidly) growing, I then
turn to the question of why the rise of temporary rent has thus far failed to stimulate any social
debate. This silent precarisation is then compared to the politically sensitive issue of labour
precarisation. Towards a conclusion, I identify the research questions that must be answered if
the significance of this process for both tenants and wider welfare-state restructuring is to be
fully understood. Some methodological suggestions for future research are also made.
2 Temporary rent in the Netherlands
Before trying to gauge the character and extent of temporary rental arrangements in the
Netherlands, it is necessary to first define what is meant exactly by temporary rent. The core of
such rental arrangements is that they can be endedwithout the landlord being legally obliged to
give a juridically valid reason for not continuing the lease. This includes fixed-term contracts
(e.g. 6 months) where the landlord is under no compulsion to renew the lease after expiration,
and unlimited contracts (such as anti-squat contracts) in which no end date is given such that
the landlord can terminate the contract at short notice. In addition, I focus on temporary rental
arrangements in the context of residence, as opposed to other forms of use, so short-term
accommodation for recreation (i.e. holiday homes) or renting for business purposes is excluded
frommy definition. Lastly, arrangements that do not involve an exchange ofmoney (i.e. letting
somebody stay for free in exchange for labour) are not considered.
In the Netherlands, permanent rental contracts have been the norm for a long time. Such
contracts are characterised by strong tenant rights, because they have an unlimited duration
and can only be terminated by the landlord for a legally restricted number of reasons. The
tenant, on the other hand, can in almost all cases always terminate the contract on a short
notice of 1 month, without having to supply a reason. Furthermore, the starting level of the
rent as well as ceilings on annual increases are in 95 % of all Dutch rental contracts not
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determined through the market, but subject to regulation (Haffner and Boumeester 2010).
Lastly, most housing regulation applies irrespective of the ownership model. That is, rent
protection in terms of security of tenure, rent levels and rent increases exists regardless of
whether one rents from a private landlord or a non-profit housing corporation.
Permanent contracts in the Netherlands can only be terminated by the landlord for three
reasons, which have to be proven in court before eviction becomes legal (Dutch Civil Law
Book 7:271–282, Lawson 2011). Firstly, if the tenant fails to meet certain basic legal
requirements, a court can terminate the contract. For example, a tenant is obliged to pay the
rent, to not cause extreme nuisance (noise, criminal behaviour) and to not damage the
property. To secure eviction on such grounds, a landlord has to prove in court that the
tenant has persistently violated at least one of these basic requirements. The second legal
ground for ending a permanent contract is that a home owner urgently needs the property
because he/she or a member of their close family wishes to live in it. In this case, the
landlord has to prove that she/he cannot reasonably be expected to seek accommodation
elsewhere. (Moreover, if the owner bought the house less than 3 years ago, this ground
does not apply.) The last legally allowed reason for terminating a rental contract occurs
when the home owner wants to demolish the dwelling or renovate it so extensively that the
tenant cannot continue to live in it. In most cases, the landlord is then obliged to supply
other, comparable housing to the tenant. Table 1 summarises the main differences between
permanent and temporary rental contracts in the Netherlands.
If we now turn to the international context, we note that inWestern Europe tenants’ rights
are in broad terms quite strong as well. Contracts are either permanent or long term, with a
right to renewal. While starting rents are often determined by the market, ceilings on annual
increases are often state regulated. In Germany, Denmark and Sweden, for instance, most
rental contracts are permanent and subject to largely the same conditions as in theNetherlands
(Kemp andKofner 2010; Scanlon 2011), while, for example, in Belgium,Austria and France,
contracts are usually of limited but long duration, and the landlord has to supply a valid reason
in court akin to the ones described above for not renewing the contract (Scanlon 2011). In
contrast, Anglo-Saxon countries are characterised by weak tenants’ rights and market dy-
namics (Scanlon 2011). Here, contracts that are either of limited duration without a right to
renewal or of unlimited duration but with termination possible at short notice are the norm. In
the UK, for instance, leases of 6 months are most common. The situation in the USA,
Australia and Canada is similar. The main differences between Anglo-Saxon and European
Table 1 Comparing permanent
rental contracts with temporary
rental contracts
Permanent rental contract Temporary rental contract
Strong tenants’ rights Weak tenants’ rights
Unlimited duration Unclear/limited duration
Difficult to terminate Easy to terminate
Rent regulation Unregulated
Table 2 Comparing European
and Anglo-Saxon countries on
tenants’ position
European Anglo-Saxon
Strong tenants’ rights Weak tenants’ rights
Long/unlimited duration Unclear/limited duration
Difficult to terminate Easy to terminate
Rent regulation Unregulated
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rental systems are summarised in Table 2. The similarity with Table 1 is deliberate: tem-
porary contracts within the otherwise permanent European rental system can be viewed as
(emerging) islands of Anglo-Saxon rental norms within that system.
The divide between these two rental systems can be seen as a reflection of the difference
in welfare-state regimes, originally caused by historically shaped national class alliances
(Esping-Andersen 1990). Indeed, whereas Anglo-Saxon countries exhibit traits of liberal
forms of government that are minimalistic in provision and rely largely on markets,
Western European countries have been characterised as either social democratic or cor-
poratist, resulting in, respectively, universalistic or more hybrid public–private provision,
but in both cases with a larger role for government intervention and regulation (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 1999). Kemeny (2001) expanded on this thesis. He argues that Anglo-
Saxon governments encouraged the market to supply rental housing and supplemented this
with a residual public housing stock for a minority of disadvantaged welfare recipients,
resulting in a dualistic rental market. In contrast, European countries did not make such a
sharp distinction between needs-based state provision of housing and private rental mar-
kets, but encouraged competition between profit and non-profit housing provision resulting
in unitary rental markets. The last two decades have seen some convergence between the
two groups of countries towards more neoliberal policies (Peters 2012), and the Nether-
lands has been no exception to this trend (Musterd 2014).
Dutch housing regulation is in theory elaborate and strict. The norm is a permanent
rental contract, and temporary contracts are only allowed for a limited, restricted number of
reasons. Four main forms can be discerned: limited contracts conditional on the status of
the house, limited contracts conditional on the status of the renter, unlimited but easy to
terminate contracts and unlawful contracts.
Firstly, limited contracts conditional on the status of the house are issued when dwellings
will be demolished, renovated or sold in the near future and for this reason cannot reasonably
be expected to be rented out normally. Over 70 % of all rental housing in the Netherlands is
owned by housing corporations, large not for profit organisations (Statistics Netherlands). In
the context of urban renewal projects, they often demolish or upgrade entire blocks of
buildings. The tenants of those blocks that have permanent contracts usually obtain a right to
replacement housing, as well as financial compensation towards moving costs (Huisman
2014). They are given a period of time to choose, and tomove into, their replacement housing.
Once these tenants leave, the vacated dwellings are rented out on a temporary basis, to prevent
them from standing empty. These temporary renters do not obtain the right to rehousing, nor
are they recognised as stakeholders in the participatory urban renewal process (Sakizlioglu
and Uitermark 2014). Also when a dwelling is empty and for sale, it can be rented out on a
temporary contract. In the Netherlands, the sale of a dwelling is not a valid reason for the
termination of a rental contract. This means that renting out a dwelling with a normal,
permanent contract will make it almost impossible for the new owner to evict the tenant and
thus make the dwelling uninteresting to buy for a future owner–occupier.
The second form of legal temporary rent is conditional on the status of the tenant. In the
case of student and youth contracts,1 people can rent a dwelling for as long as they fulfil the
condition that they are in higher education or below a certain age (Van der Molen 2011). If
students graduate or quit their studies, they are granted 6 months to find other housing; if
they fail, they can be evicted. The same applies for tenants with so-called youth contracts;
if they reach a certain age, they need to vacate their apartment (Nul20 12 June 2011 and 6
1 These contracts are commonly referred to in Dutch as campus contracts; however, most of the dwellings
involved are not situated on a university campus, but in ordinary non-university neighbourhoods.
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February 2012). Both forms of conditional contracts are recent phenomena; campus
contracts were introduced at the beginning of the 2000s, youth contracts only in 2011, on
an experimental basis.
In contrast, contracts with unlimited duration which can be terminated by the landlord at
short notice without reason are forbidden in the Netherlands. This is why anti-squat
agencies maintain that they do not rent out dwellings, but instead employ security guards to
prevent squatting and vandalism.2 These ‘security guards’, however, do not receive a
salary for their services, but have to pay a considerable fee for the privilege of guarding a
building, a fee that often reaches the level of normal rents in the Netherlands (Dutch Union
of Tenants 2014). Their contracts are notoriously precarious; it is usual that the landlord is
permitted to terminate the contract with only 2 weeks’ notice (Martı´nez-Lo´pez 2013).3 As
such, anti-squat is a deliberate attempt to circumvent strict Dutch housing regulation. Anti-
squat agency Alvast, for instance, makes this clear on its website: ‘The contracts of Alvast
are formulated in such a way that the temporary users cannot claim rights pertaining to
protection of tenure’.4 However, in some of the few cases that have been legally tested, the
courts have ruled that the ‘guards’ should be considered renters with normal, permanent
rental contracts (e.g. Amsterdam Court of Justice 2011). But given the continuing shortage
of affordable housing in the Netherlands, many anti-squatters are happy to have secured
some form of housing and do not dare or want to claim their legal rights.
The last form of temporary housing consists of the grey market. Given the scarcity of
housing in some parts of the Netherlands, many landlords manage to impose conditions on
their tenants that are not legal, such as a contract for a limited period of time or an
unlimited contract with the possibility of short-notice termination as well as rent levels or
increases above what is allowed by law. The practice whereby renters rent out their
dwellings to somebody else without permission of the landlord also falls in this category.
Both anti-squat and the grey market reflect that security of tenure for tenants is not only
just determined by existing legislation, but also on circumstances in practice, as well as
how tenants experience that reality (Hulse and Milligan 2014).
3 No data, but likely growing
Having characterised the four main forms of temporary rent in the Netherlands, it is
relevant to ask how often they occur. Unfortunately, there are currently no meaningful
statistics available. At the national aggregate level, nothing is known. The state-commis-
sioned National Survey on Housing in the Netherlands (WoON), for example, that is
repeated every 3 years and for which more than 40,000 respondents are interviewed, does
not include any question about the form of rental contracts. Statistics Netherlands does not
have any data either. An isolated housing corporation or municipality might, from time to
2 Anti-squat started off in the 1990s as a way to prevent squatting, but has turned into a form of tenure in its
own right, while the Dutch squatting movement has been marginalised (van Gemert et al. 2009).
3 Furthermore, contracts often include far-reaching restrictions: ‘‘Anti-squat regulations comprise: no
parties, no children, no pets, no smoking, no guests overnight, no vacation (permission required to leave the
house for more than three days), maintenance of house and garden, no contact to the press.’’ (Buchholz
2009:215, see also Heijkamp 2009).
4 My translation from Dutch, see www.alvast.nl/eigenaren/leegstands-beheer-anti-kraak/, last visited 15
March 2015.
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time, publish some data on temporary rent, but this occurs in a purely ad hoc fashion and is
an inadequate basis for systematic, structured analysis.
Data on the different forms of temporary rent are also sparse or non-existent. For
example, the only estimate we have of the number of anti-squatters in the Netherlands
(between 20,000 and 50,000 on a total population of 16.4 million) comes from Renooy
(2008:36). His sources are one interview with an unidentified respondent and the text found
on the website of one anti-squat agency (Renooy 2008). Because of the lack of data, the
upper bound of his estimate is continually repeated in the media (e.g. Van der Tol 2011;
Van der Ploeg 2012). Anti-squat agencies are generally reluctant to release detailed data
about their activities, arguing that it could undermine their position in the market.
Most striking, however, is the lack of structured data regarding the more official forms of
temporary rent. As far as we have been able to ascertain there are no pooled statistics
available at any level regarding the number of (formerly owner occupied) dwellings that are
being temporarily rented out while they are being sold. Similarly, there is little data available
on the number of student/youth contracts. Furthermore, temporary rent in the context of
urban renewal is not monitored. The Dutch federation of housing corporations (Aedes)
collects no data on temporary rent (personal communication Aedes, 5 March 2015). Yet,
there are several reasons for thinking the temporary sector is growing.
One important reason is the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the
ensuing global economic recession. Many urban renewal projects have been delayed or
cancelled. Even before the crisis, many housing corporations already had the tendency to
switch from permanent to temporary rent many years before the urban renewal event
nominally justifying the switch—renovation or demolition—actually takes place (de
Zeeuw 2005, 2010). In this way, the housing corporation can avoid displacing permanent
renters later in the trajectory and hence avoid the need to rehouse and compensate them.
The price, of course, is that the dwelling potentially spends many years more than nec-
essary (or, indeed, legally allowed) outside the regular, permanent rental circuit. The crisis
has only served to exacerbate the phenomenon: planned dates for renovation and demo-
lition are postponed, but the temporary rent persists. The financial crisis has also impacted
on the private market. The number of dwellings for sale has been continually increasing,
while the average time that a dwelling is for sale has significantly increased (NVM 2013).
The crisis has particularly impacted on office buildings, fuelling a boom in anti-squat
agencies’ turnover (Voorn and Heesakkers 2012).
While the phenomena described above are market driven, in the sense that lack of
access to investment capital facilitates a lengthening of a temporary phase in the life of a
building, they have been accompanied by regulatory shifts that began before the crisis but
which have accelerated in its wake. Until 2005, temporary rent was only allowed in the
case of advanced plans for demolition/far-reaching renovation or a vacated, previously
owner-occupied home being for sale. In such cases, a permit could be obtained for renting
the building out temporarily for a year. Afterwards, the permit could be renewed each year,
up to a total of 3 years. In 2005, this period was extended to 5 years. After a successful
lobby of, amongst others, the Dutch association of owner–occupiers (Vereniging Eigen
Huis), the Dutch Parliament decided in 2013 to relax the rules even further. Private home
owners selling their old dwelling on the market are no longer obliged to seek renewal of
their temporary rent permit, but immediately obtain permission for temporary rent for
5 years, and in such cases, all regulations on the maximum rent level have been lifted. The
argument is that many home owners did not intent to become landlords and that they
struggle to pay the mortgage on the low regulated rents. Housing corporations are now
permitted to temporarily rent out their houses for up to 7 years, while office space can be
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rented out for living purposes for up to 10 years. Note that this does not mean that the
tenant receives a single contract for 10 years. Rather, the tenant has a series of shorter
contracts, often between 6 months and 2 years, which the house owner renews repeatedly.
The lengthening of the legally allowed period of temporary rent up to 7 or 10 years
inevitably raises the question how temporary temporary rent actually is.
While the consequences of these latest changes of regulations were yet unknown be-
cause they were just coming into effect in the summer of 2013, at that very moment, a
campaign for further relaxation begun. Kick-started by Amsterdam housing corporations,
notably a publication by corporation Stadgenoot (de Langen and Anderiesen 2013), this
lobby soon included the national association of housing corporations (Aedes), the aldermen
in charge of housing of the four major cities Randstad, as well as the small orthodox
Christian political party ChristenUnie (Nolles 2013; Schouten et al. 2013). Their arguments
of creating living space for currently underserved target groups such as youngsters and
increasing residential mobility convinced the current Minister of Housing Stef Blok. In
summer 2014, he proposed far-reaching changes to the law. Temporary renting contracts
will be introduced as a normal form of tenure. The only restrictions will be that the contract
can be for a maximum of 2 years and that it cannot be extended for the same tenant.
However, the modest amount of attention this proposal drew concerned not this previously
unheard of major abolishment of rent protection, but focused instead exclusively on
marginal specific measures for certain target groups such as students, youngsters or
problematic renters (but see Dutch Bar Association 2014). Indeed, Minister Blok (2014)
downplayed the impact of these changes arguing that because of the transaction costs
involved, landlords will not engage en masse in temporary contracts. The proposal was
received positively by the majority of Parliament, and at the time of writing, it is expected
that the changes to the law will come through by 1 July 2015.
As such, it is entirely plausible that we will observe a further expansion of temporary
living arrangements in the near future. In the previously highly regulated housing market of
the Netherlands, this will constitute a significant shift towards weaker tenants’ rights. Yet,
this change in the distribution of rights and risks between landlords and tenants has not
sparked any discussion in the public domain so far. In the next section, I develop a tentative
exploration why this shift is has been silent so far, and how we can understand it.
4 A silent shift
No structural research documents the extent of temporary rental arrangements in the
Netherlands, while there are ample signals that it is increasing. I identify four principal
reasons for this lack of non-anecdotal, non-incidental studies. The first explanation lies in
the assumption that temporary rent adds to the stock, and the second in the assumption that
it constitutes a transient phase in people’s lives. The third cause concerns the use of
temporary rent to ‘patch up’ certain problems in housing policy, without considering the
aggregate effect of many such patches. The fourth factor is connected to the inherent
difficulty of measuring the phenomenon of temporary rent.
As regards the first point, a common assumption amongst politicians, policy makers and
researchers in the Netherlands, is that temporary rent is adding to the current housing
stock, because the dwellings concerned otherwise would have remained empty. Given the
continuing scarcity of housing in (some parts of) the Netherlands, adding more housing to
the stock is conceived as a positive development. However, given the growth of temporary
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rent, the question is whether rather than adding, it is replacing other, more structural uses
of the housing stock, especially given the continuously lengthening periods of time in-
volved. In the case of home owners struggling to sell their old home, the bonus now put on
temporary rent by the recent decision of the Dutch government to significantly deregulate it
will almost certainly lead to replacement; as long as the dwelling is at least nominally kept
on the market, a landlord will naturally opt for a temporary contract of fixed duration with
a free-market rent above a permanent contract that is difficult to terminate with a regulated
rent. In the context of urban renewal, a dwelling that is rented out temporarily for
5–10 years as it waits for a renovation that might never happen should also be considered
to be replacing a dwelling that could have been rented out permanently.
The second common assumption explaining the disinterest in temporary rent in the
Netherlands that prevails amidst the Dutch housing policy community concerns the renters
themselves. It is often assumed they are young, highly educated, unattached and thus
robust to the insecurity of temporary rent. The precarious living situation will only con-
stitute a short and transient phase in their lives, it is thought, after which they will move on
more secure forms of housing, such as a permanent rental contract or owner-occupied
housing: the stereotypical temporary renter is a student. But there is no reason to assume
that other, less advantaged people will not end up in such insecure housing. The continuing
scarcity of affordable housing in many Dutch cities, the increasing shift towards a market-
based model of housing, and the lack of any safety net for outsiders and newcomers imply
that pressing need, rather than free choice, is often a determinant of how and where people
live (Dutch Union of Tenants 2013). The extension of the maximum permissible period of
temporary rent to 10 years, and the corresponding emergence of almost ‘permanent tem-
porariness’, also means it is more likely that initially ‘robust’ temporary renters will lose
this robustness during the tenancy, i.e. they will shift into a new life phase such as family
formation.
The third factor behind the lack of interest in temporary rent is the fact that most forms
of temporary tenure are usually only considered from the angle of the specific problem they
are supposed to be address. Policy makers, politicians and academics focus on distinct
problems, such as keeping houses occupied during urban renewal or relieving home
owners with financial problems due to double mortgages because they bought a new home
without having sold the old one. The compound effects of all these isolated policy re-
sponses are seldom considered, leading to the assumption that temporary rent arrangements
are a marginal phenomenon. However, I argue that if we take the extent of and increase in
the various forms of temporary rent arrangements as a whole, this constitutes a significant
shift towards the temporary.
The above-described assumptions that temporary renting is a positive, though marginal
phenomenon because it adds housing to the stock that is used as a temporary stop-over by
people able to deal with the insecurity, combined with a focus on individual policy re-
sponses explain why there is no interest of researchers, politicians, policy makers and other
housing professionals in collecting data. But another reason is that collecting data on the
character and extent of temporary rent presents a daunting methodological challenge. The
gold standard approach to find out how many people live in temporary housing in the
Netherlands would be, of course, to count them or estimate their number through a random
sample. Unfortunately, due to the specific nature of temporary housing, this will be dif-
ficult. The semi-legal and fleeting character of precarious living does not lend itself very
well to random sampling techniques. For instance, drawing a sample from the municipal
population register (GBA) will omit many people. Although legally people are obliged to
register at the address they factually live (Law on the Municipal Population Register
A silent shift? The precarisation of the Dutch rental housing… 101
123
articles 65–66), many municipalities do not allow people to register in buildings not
designated for living. As a result, many anti-squatted buildings are officially registered as
empty. Secondly, in the case of dwellings, home owners often do not allow temporary
renters to register (see for an example of a housing corporation Central Council of Appeal
2008). Temporary renters are furthermore unlikely to respond to general surveys because
of their semi-legal and precarious living status. Dutch survey response rates are low at
55 % at best (Stoop 2005), and the non-response is heavily biased exactly towards renters
and low-income groups (Te Riele 2002). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, anti-squat
agencies have been shown to be reluctant to divulge information.
In conclusion, I argue that the lack of research and the related lack of data have meant
that an important shift in the Dutch rental system has gone unobserved. The Netherlands
seems to be shifting towards the Anglo-Saxon model of weaker tenant rights, without this
being an explicit policy goal. This stands in stark contrast with the shift towards home
ownership, which has been extensively promoted by the Dutch government and exten-
sively studied. Moreover, it also contrasts with the elaborate attention devoted to a similar,
earlier shift in another domain, namely the demise of the permanent labour contract in the
context of the rise of temporary contracts.
Interestingly, this shift seems to be more important for its symbolic meaning than for its
statistical importance: between 1992 and 2012, the number of Dutch workers with a
permanent contract decreased only from 75 to 69 %, while the number of temporary
employed workers increased from 13 to 16 %, and the number of self-employed persons
increased from 12 to 15 % (Statistics Netherlands, see also Co¨rvers et al. 2011). However,
it would be wrong to conclude that the discussions of the last 15 years about the pre-
carisation of labour are much ado about nothing. On the contrary, the debate about this
shift of risks from employer to worker (Kalleberg 2009) is at the heart of (European)
welfare-state reform and the underwhelming statistics potentially mask a generational
trend. Could, for example, the rise of the temporary labour contract be an age-related
phenomenon? That is, will the youngsters that now have temporary contracts obtain a
permanent contract later on in their career or will they have to spend most of their
professional lives switching from one temporary contract to another?
Analogous questions could be posed regarding the emergence of temporary rent. How
large is the sector? How is it composed? What is its wider significance for welfare-state
reform? Is the extent of the shift masked by generational factors? Yet, as observed earlier
in this article, there is neither data nor debate. Potentially, then, the sector is being pre-
carised without any of the critical attention associated with labour precarisation. This silent
shift therefore deserves attention from researchers, both at the theoretical and at the
methodological level.
5 Research agenda: investigating the precarisation of the Dutch housing
market
To fill the gap in our knowledge, we need to know more about the various forms of
temporary rental arrangements in the Netherlands. Are there more contracts with a limited
length, or are there more contracts that run indefinitely but can be ended with 2 weeks’
notice? What are the main categories of people in precarious housing? Are they indeed
young and unattached, as often is assumed, or are there also more vulnerable people ending
up in temporary rent? Are motivations for being in this form of tenure mainly positive (low
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cost, easy access), negative (no alternative) or neutral? What combinations of such push
and pull factors occur? How do residents experience this form of housing, is it stressful,
problematic, adventurous? Is temporary rent geographically concentrated in the four lar-
gest cities known as the Randstad, or in urban areas, or is it occurring throughout the
country? And what proportion of the Dutch housing market is non-permanent? These are
some of the questions that need to be answered if we want to seriously engage with this
neglected form of housing. But apart from these empirical questions into what, who and
how many, there are also pressing broader questions. What does this shift signify? What is
the history? Who are the main actors involved? Can we observe similar changes in other
Table 3 Researching the silent shift: topics and methods
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countries, in Europe perhaps? How is the discourse pertaining to living in insecure cir-
cumstances evolving over time? What can we learn from the labour precarisation literature,
and what are the differences and similarities? I believe these questions (organised in
Table 3) can be summarised as follows:
What is the extent and character of precarious housing in the Netherlands?
How should we understand the silent growth of temporary rent in the Netherlands in the
context of precarisation?
Concerning method, it would be a great improvement if large-scale housing surveys
(such as WoON) would recognise temporary rent as an existing form of housing and if
questions concerning this form of tenure would be incorporated. In this way, the empirical
foundations for accurately monitoring the character as well as the growth of the sector over
time can be laid. Alternatively, data could be collected by devising and administering
surveys targeted specifically on temporary rent. To obtain a deep understanding of how
insecure housing impacts on people’s lives, more qualitative methods can be employed. In
particular, interviews with tenants will yield more insight into the experiences of people.
The more general shift can be investigated by studying policy documents, media content,
as well as through interviewing key figures such as directors of anti-squat agencies,
housing corporations and politicians. These are just a few examples of how one could go
about closing the gap in our knowledge. Undoubtedly, other, more creative ideas could be
employed. But my main point is not how we should research precarious housing in the
Netherlands, but that the issue urgently requires attention.
A practical goal of proposing this research agenda is to provide policy makers with data
on temporary housing in the Netherlands. This is especially relevant given that there is a
clear trend in policy towards further expansion of the temporary sector. By more accurately
quantifying the size and character of the sector, we can clarify how far existing policy
actually reflects, and influences, the reality of temporary rent on the ground. In this way,
the desirability of future expansion of the sector could be critically assessed. Indeed,
perhaps the most important goal of proposing this research agenda is to stimulate an open
and fundamental societal debate about the appropriate balance between legal protection of
renters and the rights of landlords. By gathering and making public information about the
extent and the character of precarious housing in the Netherlands, not only a much needed
empirical basis for such discussions will be created, but also the findings themselves will
help put the topic of this silent shift on the agenda.
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